Gesture and Language : Mind and Body

Robin Allott
Seaford, England

The acquisition of language was the turning-point for the evolutionary separation of humans from apes. From this flowed the ascent of human intelligence with the ratcheting up of human mental and cultural advance as a result of interaction between individual variations in brain structure and development and continually advancing complexity of the social, technological and cultural environment (a manifestation of the Baldwin effect). Both body and brain were involved in the acquisition and advance of language, phylogenetically and ontogenetically. The relation between mind-state and body-state was manifested not only in the patterning of emotion (the James/Lange theory) but also in the selection of words (articulatory programs) to match patterns of perception, both of external objects and also innate attitudinal patterns, "mental" structures, which went to form both language syntax and motor syntax (cf. Karl Lashley, Kant). Gestures are derived from, or rather are parallel expressions of, the motor patterning which generates distinct articulations (cf. Browman and Goldstein, David McNeill). These parallelisms of word and gesture (dual expressions of meaning) can be made overt by specific controlled mind/brain operations

(cf. http://www.percepp.demon.co.uk/animations.htm)

The First Articulation of Language and the Original Paradigm

Pierre J. Bancel and Alain Mathhey de l’Étang
Paris, France

A fundamental feature of human language is its double articulation, first analyzed by the French linguist André Martinet (1970). As it appears to him, the first articulation of language is the combination of basic meaningful entities he calls monemes (i.e. word roots and morphemes) into sentences ; the second articulation is the combination of basic meaningless entities, phonemes, into the meaningful monemes. The order specified by Martinet for the two articulations of human language is overtly based on a thought-to-speech view of the human mind: (i) the speaker thinks a thought, (ii) articulates it into “monemes” (word roots and morphemes) so as to get a well-formed sentence, then (iii) articulates monemes into phonemes so as to get a speakable sound string. Probably it was also (or even essentially) inspired by the way linguists usually work: (i) gathering utterances, (ii) analyzing them into words and morphemes and studying their arrangement to deduce morphological and syntactic rules, then (iii) analyzing words into phonemes and studying their arrangement to deduce phonological rules.
  From a theoretical viewpoint, the double articulation is a direct extension of the distinction between signifiant and signifié (Saussure 1916). It expresses the fact that, in the speech flow, each minimal unit of signifié (Martinet’s monemes) does not coincide with a minimal unit of signifiant (Martinet’s phonemes) but with a string of them. (This fact is one of the roots of another Saussurean principle, the arbitrariness of linguistic sign.) Double articulation is universally recognized as correct by linguists. However, and in spite of its fundamental nature, it strikingly was not the source of a wide array of linguistic work, and seems to have remained much of an inert principle.
  We will contend here that the order given by Martinet to the two articulations sterilized this important discovery. Because this order is wrong. The first articulation of language is the phonetic one, and syntax comes only second. For to combine “monemes” (words, morphemes) into sentences, you have to have monemes at hand – or, rather, at mouth. And to get enough monemes to combine into anything, you must have phonemes to build them before. This fact is illustrated – literally billions of times – by child language acquisition. Around 6‑9 months, a child enters a period of phonetic training during which he utters articulate sound sequences devoid of meaning, typically pa-pa-pa, ma-ma-ma, da-da-da, na-na-na (Oller 1980). Then, around 11‑12 months, the child emits his first isolated words, typically papa or mama (Locke 1983).        
   Between 12 and 18 months, the child acquires new words, always used in isolation. Finally, around 18‑24 months, at an age where he actively masters several dozen to several hundreds of isolated words, the child utters his first combinations of two words, thus entering the world of syntactically articulate language (Brigaudiot & Danon-Boileau 2002). Though the respective ages where these stages take place may vary according to children, their order is always the same, and for a cogent reason : each stage is necessarily mastered before achieving mastering the next one. Without syllables there are no words, without (a lot of) words there are no sentences.
We will explore some far-reaching implications of the correct order of the two articulations of language for the evolution of language ability in humans.

References

Brigaudiot, M. Danon-Boileau, L. (2002), La Naissance du langage dans les deux premières années. Paris : Presses Univ. de France.
Locke, J.L (1983), Phonological Acquisition and Change, New York: Academic Press.
Martinet, A. (1970/2003), Éléments de linguistique générale, Paris: Armand Colin.
Oller, D. K. (1980), The Emergence of the Sounds of Speech in Infancy, InYeni-Komshian, G.H., Kavanagh, J.F., and Ferguson, C.A. (Eds.), Child Phonology, vol. I: Production. New York: Academic Press.
Saussure, F. de. 1916 (repr. 1995). Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot.

The Darwinian Evolution of Natural Languages

Bernard H. Bichakjian
Professor emeritus
Radboud University, Nijmegen

Much too often, history records times when certain topics cannot be discussed simply because higher instances have taken the attitude and decreed that their position shall be the only one, since theirs, at least their eyes, is self-evidently right. The tragic error of communism comes immediately to mind, but there are other examples, some uncomfortably close to home.
In linguistics, a science not always immune to political winds, the official injunc­tion is to keep evolution out of one’s research, unless one limits the discussion to spec­ulative proposals about the biological process whereby our speechless ancestor became endowed with the gift of tongues. The hypothesis that a given linguistic feature can have selective advantages over a comparable one and the attendant argument that languages could have evolved by repeatedly replacing their extant implements with more efficient and higher performing alternatives are simply not part of the received research paradigm.

Information and Knowledge in a Simulated Stock Market

Alessandro Cappellini, ISI Foundation, University of Turin, Italy
Gianluigi Ferraris, University of Turin, Italy

The decisions in financial markets are often based upon information aggregation. In fact, the traders share information and news during informal chatting; the perception of those information influences traders’ behaviours. Our research question concerns the simulation of the described process towards obtaining plausible prices trends, and a sufficient number of trades, through the interaction of agents that have a limited information level.
  This paper will focus on the role of suggestions interchange and social learning in the traders’ decision making process and in their own knowledge evolution. An original information based decision algorithm has been built to drive agents’ actions, by exploiting the “memetic” paradigm, like it is described in Dawkins, and the human mind processes described by the psychologist (Atkinson and Shiffrin, Lindsay and Norman, Sperling, Miller...).
  Such an algorithm could be pretended to support a kind of social learning due to the evaluation and evolution phases. During the first phase, the received suggestions, as well as own ideas, are given a value strictly related to their expected performance, whereas in the second phase, better ideas are chosen to be amalgamated to obtain useful inferences. In this way each agent’s knowledge evolve toward better performances and, consequently, its suggestions become more and more useful; since each one’s suggestion is spread it could improve other agents knowledge bringing the learning process at a social level.  
  In a mechanist description a market could be drawn as a crowd of people interested in trading stocks, and earning money, with heterogeneous beliefs or expectations on shares trends. The stock market has been traditionally considered very sensible to the information spreading, even simple rumours. To perform the research an Agent Based stock market simulation, SumWEB, has been employed (Lux and Marchesi, Arthur, Le Baron, Terna, Pellizzari, Dal Forno and Bottazzi).
  Early results confirmed the positive answer to the research question: agents with limited information have been able to submit orders capable to maintain “alive” the market with a plausible price trend. An evident attribute of our agents is “docility” or, according to Simon, “the tendency to depend on suggestions, recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained through social channels as a major basis for choice”.

Qualia and their Substratum, or: the Epistemology behind a Research Programme

G.J. Dalenoort
Groningen, The Netherlands

The models we make of systems in the world, of ourselves, and of other persons, have objective as well as subjective aspects. We make a choice of the ways we want to describe phenomena in the world, which we ascribe to certain objects, that together constitute a large variety of types of systems. On the other hand, we also choose the types of questions we want to answer on those phenomena, and of the objects and processes we believe are underlying those phenomena. Different disciplines make different types of choices, for example, there are big differences between the ways physics, biology, and psychology describe phenomena, and the types of models constructed to order the phenomena, and to describe causes, goals, and underlying processes. There are essential differences as to the role of these aspects, and also as to the aspect of self-organisation.

Microsynchronicity: An Experimental Hint for Non-Locality in Brain
Functioning  - or: Entanglement Correlations between Observer and the Observed

Walter v. Lucadou
Freiburg

The paper presents an experiment that is a conceptual replication of two earlier experiments which demonstrate entanglement correlations between a quantum physical random process and certain psychological variables of human observers.
  In the present study button-pushes were used as psychological variables. The button-pushes were performed by the subject with his or her left or right hand in order to “control” (according to the instruction) a random process that could be observed on a display. Each button-push started the next random event which, however, in reality, was independent of the button-pushes.
  The study consists of three independent sets of data (n = 386) that were gained with almost the same apparatus in three different experimental situations. The first data set serves as reference. It was an automatic control-run without subjects. The second set was produced mainly by subjects who were highly motivated. The third set of data (of the same size) was collected during two public exhibitions (at Basel and at Freiburg) where the visitors had the opportunity to participate in the experiment.
  The results corroborate the previous studies. The specific way how the subjects pushed the buttons is highly significantly correlated with the independent random process. This correlation shows up for the momentarily generated random events as well as for the previous and the later runs during the experimental session. In a strict sense, only the correlations with the future random events can be interpreted as non-local correlations. The structure of the data, however, allows the conclusion, that all observed correlations can be considered as entanglement-correlations. The number of entanglement-correlations was significantly higher for the highly motivated group (data set 2) than for the unselected group of  the exhibition participants (data set 3).  The latter, however, where not completely unsuccessful: A subgroup who showed “innovative” behaviour also showed significant entanglement-correlations.
  These results are in agreement with the predictions of the “Weak Quantum Theory (WQT)” (by Atmanspacher et al. 2002) and the “Model of Pragmatic Information (MPI)” (Lucadou, Römer, Walach 2007). These models interpret the measured correlations as entanglement-correlations within a self-organizing, organizationally closed, psycho-physical system that exist during a certain time-interval. The entanglement-correlations cannot be considered as a causal influence and thus are called "micro-synchronicity".

Atmanspacher, H., Römer, H., Walach, H. (2002), ‘Weak quantum theory: Complementarity and entanglement in physics and beyond’, Foundations of Physics, 32, p. 379–406
Lucadou, W.v., Römer, H., Walach, H. (2007),"Synchronistic Phenomena as Entanglement Correlations in Generalized Quantum Theory", Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, 2007, 
(forthcoming).

Motivated Belief Formation: is that a Small World?

Cosimo Nobile, Floriana Grasso
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, UK

Human Agents hold beliefs and attitudes that are neither always predictable nor obvious and whose understanding still represents one of the major challenges in philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences. The work presented here, based on psychological and philosophical theories, explores the role of motivation in complex belief dynamics, and is situated in the area of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, with the final aim of providing a computational model of these phenomena. Motivation clearly affects belief formation and change but, in spite of all the evidence in support of it, and all its promising applications, current formal models of belief dynamics do not capture such motivational effects.
I shall discuss the process of Motivated Belief Formation (MBF) by putting it in relation to some of its main causes and effects. Special attention will be given to irrational aspects of MBF and the roles of self-deception and wishful thinking. These mechanisms presuppose a proactive behaviour in belief revision, contradicting the more common hypothesis in the logical models whereby the new piece of information is rationally analysed and finds its proper place in the mental state.
In particular I am interested in how MBF and Belief Perseverance influence each other. This phenomenon has not received enough attention from a computational viewpoint. Rational-choice models attempt to mimic how humans reason, but there is of course a discrepancy between the technicality and constraints of the theories and the real thing.
I advocate for a more holistic view of belief revision, in which motivation becomes a first class citizen. While doing this, I put forward a novel view of belief dynamics as a phenomenon that can be represented as a "small world" network, and I claim that accounting for motivation in belief dynamics would restrict even further this representation in a "scale-free" network where the preferential attachment process is driven by MBF and the "hubs" in the network correspond to persistent beliefs.

The Cognitive Logic Project

Pieter A. M. Seuren
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics,
PO Box 310, 6500 AH  Nijmegen - Netherlands

Nobody has ever worked out the logic of cognition and of natural language. This is what I do in this project. The emphasis will be on predicate logic (quantification theory). Any logic is defined by the meanings of its operators. In language, these operators are words, which have meanings. These meanings define the logic of language. The question is, therefore, of an empirical nature: what are the meanings of the quantifiers, the negation, and the logical connectives in natural languages? I will demonstrate a way of reducing any logic to set-theory. For natural logic this means that we consider hypothetically a natural set-theory, which is the way humans deal cognitively with plural objects. The hypothesis distinguishes three levels of sophistication for set theory and for logics: the basic-natural (BN), the strict-natural (SN), and the standard modern (SM) level. The BN level is carried by the ordinary, natural intuitions everybody has. It corresponds with the logic proposed by Hamilton (1860), which is sound, but proves inconsistent through discourse. The SN level is carried by the same natural intuitions but enriched with corrections due to normal western-society education. The corresponding logic is the traditional Aristotelian-Boethian predicate logic known as the Square of Opposition. This logic is unsound (it suffers from undue existential import), but is discourse-proof. Its logical fault was repaired by the Medieval philosopher Abelard (1079-1142), but his solution was never properly understood and ignored by later logicians. The SM level is the result of highly specialised academic thinking by mathematicians and logicians; it equals standard modern set theory and corresponds with standard modern predicate logic. However, both the set-theory and the logic clash badly with natural intuitions. The concept of logical power will be defined for the first time. Under this definition, BN-logic, though despised by logicians, proves to be by far the most powerful, but it is not discourse-proof. SN-logic -- that is, the traditional Square of Opposition -- is quite powerful and discourse-proof, but it is logically unsound. SM-logic is both logically sound and discourse-proof, but its logical power has dwindled to a paltry minimum. Finally, it is shown that SN-logic (the Square) is highly functional for human communication and looks very much as if selected by nature for the specific purpose of cognition and cognition-based linguistic interaction. Nature has repaired its logical defect by means of a presuppositional machinery, which cuts through the classic Principle of the Excluded Third and makes for an unorthodox logic incorporating the Square.
All that can be presented is an illustrated outline of the story. The full story fills a tome or two.

Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
PO Box 310, 6500 AH  Nijmegen, The Netherlands

A Naturalized Conception of Qualia

Carlos de Sousa
University of Konstanz, Germany

Usually qualia are defined as the qualitative properties of conscious experience. Their existence seems indubitable, because every human has feelings, and experiences tastes, sounds, colors, etc. Some authors say that qualia do not play any role in our life, for either qualia are epiphenomena, or do not exist. This paper presents a naturalized account of qualia. According to the hypothesis, qualia play a role in evolutionary history. They were selected because of their efficiencies in keeping organisms informed about the actual state of affairs in the environment; they contribute by keeping organisms informed about the actual state of the body, and by representing the state of the environment in real-time. Natural selection has endowed living systems with different sensory modalities (visual, auditory, olfactory systems, etc.). Each organism has evolved specific mechanisms in order to detect patterns and forms. The world has an almost inexhaustible number of patterns and forms, and organisms must be able to detect and select what matters from what does not. By assigning sense to these set of patterns and forms, organisms can give a better response to constraints from the environment. One might interpret the entire evolutionary history of organisms in terms of their ability to detect, process, and interpret the patterns and forms by converting them to relevant information. When the incoming information is processed and related to categories in the mind, it acquires meaning for the organism. Subsequently they are stored in memory. Qualia can be remembered, and used to make a decision. For instance, enjoying the taste of wine makes one drinks wine. A specialist is able to discriminate between Pinot-like and Bordeaux-like wines. On the basis of the information stored in memory one can decide between different strategies of action. Accordingly, qualia are the result of the dynamical process of detecting, processing, and assigning sense to information, and therefore play a central role in our life.  Moreover they are shared throughout by organisms in nature.

E-mail: carlosphi at yahoo.de

The Robustness of Cognitive Brain Functioning

Dr. P.H. de Vries
Dept. of Psychology, University of Groningen

The brain processes underlying cognitive functions must be very robust. Disruptions such as the destruction of large numbers of neurons or the impact of alcohol and lack of sleep do not have negative effects except when they occur in aan extreme form. A possible explanation for this robustness may be that the parameters determining the functioning of individual neurons in networks must have large ranges. The simulation of a minimal neuronal architecture necessary to study cognitive robustness is described, which consists of a loop of three cell-assemblies. A crucial factor in this architecture is the critical threshold of a cell-assembly. When activated at a level above the critical threshold, the activation in a cell-assembly is subject to autonomous growth, which leads to an oscillation in the loop. When activated below the critical threshold, excitation gradually extinguishes. In order to circumvent the large parameter space of spiking neurons, a rate-dependent model of neuronal firing was chosen. The resulting parameter space of twelve parameters was explored by means of a genetic algorithm. The ranges of the parameters for which the architecture produced the required oscillations and extinctions, turned out to be relatively narrow. These ranges remained narrow even when a mechanism controlling the total amount of activation was introduced. Consequently there must exist other stabilizing mechanisms that make the network robust. The synchronization of neurons at the level of spikes may play an important role in such mechanisms. This would imply that synchronization not only plays a role in the temporal coupling of cell-assemblies ('binding') but also in the robustness of the structural connections between cell-assemblies. Both roles are compatible with the proposed architecture.